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TICKY TACKY LITTLE GOVERNMENTS?†
A MORE FAITHFUL APPROACH TO COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS
UNDER THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
AARON R. GOTT*
ABSTRACT
 Community associations1 are an innovative solution to myriad challenges that arise in 
the ownership of residential property. They solve collective action problems and fulfill 
desires in the common pursuit of neighborhood harmony. But when community associations 
go too far to conform and perfect the neighborhoods they govern, they often intrude on the 
fundamental liberties of individual property owners. Without intervention, they stand to 
threaten the rights of a substantial number of U.S. citizens where it matters most: in the home.2
 State action doctrine provides an adequate safeguard against this threat. However, 
courts have struggled to hold community associations to account under the doctrine because 
they don’t fit squarely into the quintessential state action models. The result is seemingly 
faithful to the black letter of state action precedent, but not its purpose. This Note analyzes 
these problems and offers what may be a more faithful approach in both the letter and spirit 
of state action doctrine. 
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 1. A term referring to the private organizations (usually nonprofit corporations orga-
nized under the laws of the state in which they operate) charged with operating various 
types of common interest communities; it includes, among others, condominium associa-
tions, homeowners’ associations, and cooperative associations. For the purposes of this 
Note, the differences between these associations are of little significance except as other-
wise noted. The author does not intend to portray all community associations as bad actors 
and wishes to make clear that common interest communities often do more good than 
harm; however, this is not enough to protect those individuals whose rights are infringed 
upon—whether intentionally or not—by community associations.  
 2. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58 (1994) (“A special respect for individual 
liberty in the home has long been part of our culture and our law . . . .”).  
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I. INTRODUCTION
 The American dream may now come with a hidden cost: individual 
rights. In the interest of living in a nice community,3 a property 
owner might be subject to prohibitions on the display of political yard 
signs and the American flag,4 or even jailed for failing to water the 
grass.5 Community associations restrict ownership of residential 
property and aggressively enforce repressive codes of conduct 
governing the most private aspects of people’s lives6 in ways that may 
implicate equal protection, due process, freedom of speech and 
assembly, and even the rights to firearms and privacy, among others.7
 Those who seek to realize the dream of home ownership 
unencumbered by community association governance face an 
increasingly daunting task. As of the last census, nearly 25 million8 of 
the 116 million households9 in the United States were subject to 
community association governance, a proportion likely to swell as the 
bulk of U.S. population growth continues to occur in the suburbs.10
Property accompanied by mandatory membership in a community 
association accounts for “nearly all new residential development in 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 3. See Paula A. Franzese, Privatization and Its Discontents: Common Interest Com-
munities and the Rise of Government for “the Nice,” 37 URB. LAW. 335, 337 (2005). 
 4. See, e.g., Stone Hill Cmty. Ass’n v. Norpel, 492 N.W.2d 409, 410 (Iowa 1992) (up-
holding flagpole prohibition against World War II combat veteran on grounds that “restric-
tive covenants . . . are recognized under Iowa law and exist to protect existing and future 
property owners . . . .”).  
 5. Erin Sullivan, Man Jailed for Brown Lawn Gets Help From Neighbors, ST. PETERS-
BURG TIMES (Oct. 12, 2008), ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????.
 6. See generally EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE 
RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 12-21 (1994).  
 7. “[N]owhere else are private property rights restricted more than in [community] 
associations across the nation. ‘The entrepreneurship, creativity, sense of individuality 
that we prize is being ground down relentlessly under the conformity and regimentation 
that has been foisted on people’s homes.’ [Consumer organizations] liken the associations to 
‘giant bulldozers that ravage the rights of homeowners’ . . . across the country . . . .’ ” Sharon 
L. Bush, Beware the Associations: How Homeowners’ Associations Control You and Infringe 
Upon Your Inalienable Rights!!, 30 W. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2003) (citations omitted).  
 8. Industry Data: National Statistics, COMMUNITY ASS’NS INST.,
http://www.caionline.org/info/research/pages/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 2, 2012). 
 9. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2010 CENSUS BRIEFS C2010BR-14, HOUSEHOLDS AND FAMI-
LIES: 2010 (2012), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-14.pdf.  
 10. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 SPECIAL REPORTS CENSR-4, DEMOGRAPHIC 
TRENDS IN THE 20TH CENTURY 33 (2002), http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/censr-4.pdf 
(explaining that in the last century most metropolitan growth has occurred in the suburbs). 
Suburban population growth is in temporary reprieve as the “sharp downturn in the sub-
urban housing market has left many cities holding on to would-be suburbanites.” Don Lee, 
U.S. Population in Cities Growing Faster than in Suburbs, L.A. TIMES (June 28, 2012), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/28/nation/la-na-census-cities-20120628.  
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California, Florida, and Texas and fifty percent of all housing for sale 
in the fifty largest metropolitan areas.”11
 Although community associations represent “the most significant 
privatization of local government responsibilities in recent times,”12
courts have yet to constrain their power to the limits of the 
Constitution under the state action doctrine with but a few 
exceptions. As private actors not held subject to the constitutional 
limitations that constrain municipal, state, and federal governments, 
community associations may intrude upon all facets of their subjects’ 
lives without regard for constitutional guarantees.13
 However unprecedented in scope, the threat that accompanies 
community associations is not new:  
Many people in the United States live in company-owned towns. 
These people, just as residents of municipalities, are free citizens 
of their State and country. . . . There is no more reason for 
depriving these people of the liberties guaranteed by the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments than there is for curtailing these 
freedoms with respect to any other citizen.14
 In 1946, less than one percent of Americans lived in company-
owned towns.15 Today, more than one in five U.S. households belong 
to a common interest community governed by a private association.16
These communities often share as much in common with traditional 
municipalities as company-owned towns, and the associations that 
govern them often enjoy broad power over their respective residents’ 
conduct and property.17 Despite these similarities, courts have 
generally rejected the comparison of community associations to 
company towns, as well as comparisons to the private actors subject 
to constitutional limitations under other state action theories.18
                                                                                                                                                                       
 11. Steven Siegel, The Constitution and Private Government: Toward the Recognition 
of Constitutional Rights in Private Residential Communities Fifty Years After Marsh v. 
Alabama, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 461, 469 (1998). 
 12. Steven Siegel, The Public Role in Establishing Private Residential Communities: 
Towards a New Formulation of Local Government Land Use Policies that Eliminates the 
Legal Requirements to Privatize New Communities in the United States, 38 URB. LAW. 859, 
865 (2006) (quoting U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RESIDENTIAL 
COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM?
18 (1989)).  
 13. See Uriel Reichman, Residential Private Governments: An Introductory Survey, 43 
U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 267-68 (1976) (“[T]he residential private government comprises yet 
another layer of day-to-day regulation that further reduces those personal liberties defined 
in terms of property rights.”).  
 14. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1946) (footnotes omitted).  
 15. See Siegel, supra note 11, at 478 n.70; see also Marsh, 326 U.S. at 508 n.5. 
 16. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text. 
 17. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 18. See discussion infra Part II. According to one lawyer, twenty-five states have 
“made it clear that they would not apply the Constitution to private [community] associa-
tions with respect to their internal membership rules . . . .” Barry S. Goodman, Twin Riv-
ers: Why the Appellate Division Got It Wrong, N.J. LAW. MAG., Oct. 2006, at 4, 4.  
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 Some courts have fancifully portrayed community associations’ 
powers as necessary to modern suburban living through an 
innovative application of common law servitudes or covenants 
running with land.19 Others dismiss state action claims by reasoning 
that community association powers result from property owners’ 
voluntary contractual agreements to be bound to mutually beneficial 
restrictions.20 Still others realize the trouble of comparing the private 
actors of another era to the community associations of today.21
 This Note will first explain how state action doctrine has been 
perceived and applied by courts in cases involving community 
associations. It will then outline a framework that may be more 
faithful to the purpose of the doctrine and established U.S. Supreme  
Court precedent.  
II. THE DOCTRINE AND JUDICIAL PERCEPTIONS OF ITS 
APPLICATION TO COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS
 Since its inception, the Fourteenth Amendment has generally 
been understood to prohibit only actions by a state and its agents.22
Were this absolute, a state could deprive individuals of the rights the 
amendment secures by encouragement, endorsement, mechanism of 
the law, or by delegating its police power. If states could achieve 
unconstitutional goals through private agents, the Fourteenth 
Amendment would be without a remedy.23 If violations of the rights it 
secures cannot be remedied, it becomes little more than an empty 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 19. See Woodside Vill. Condo. Ass’n v. Jahren, 806 So. 2d 452, 456 (Fla. 2002) (“A 
declaration of a condominium is more than a mere contract spelling out mutual rights and 
obligations of the parties thereto—it assumes some of the attributes of a covenant running 
with the land, circumscribing the extent and limits of the enjoyment and use of real prop-
erty. . . . From the outset, courts have recognized that condominium living is unique and 
involves a greater degree of restrictions upon the rights of the individual unit owners when 
compared to other property owners.” (citations omitted)); Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. 
Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) (“[T]o promote the health, happiness, 
and peace of mind of the majority of the unit owners since they are living in such close 
proximity and using facilities in common, each unit owner must give up a certain degree of 
freedom of choice which he might otherwise enjoy . . . .”); Stone Hill Cmty. Ass’n v. Norpel, 
492 N.W.2d 409, 410 (Iowa 1992) (“[R]estrictive covenants . . . exist to protect existing and 
future property owners . . . .”); Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Resi-
dential Associations and Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 11 (1989) (“Recent cases re-
flect judicial awareness of the group character of residential life in common unit develop-
ments. The sense that emerges from these cases is that courts regard these arrangements 
as new forms of residency, fundamentally different from both traditional fee ownership of 
the detached house and apartment living.” (footnote omitted)).  
 20. See Compiano v. Kuntz, 226 N.W.2d 245, 249 (Iowa 1975) (“[R]estrictive covenants 
[are] agreements or promises and therefore contractual.”); discussion infra Part II.D. 
 21. See discussion infra Part II. 
 22. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (“Indi-
vidual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment.”). 
 23. Cf. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469 (1953) (applying the same reasoning to the 
Fifteenth Amendment).  
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promise masked in formalism.24 State action doctrine provides a 
remedy where this occurs.25
While courts and scholars have proffered various explanations of 
state action doctrine, most come in the form of a categorical 
analysis.26 Though authorities vary, three categories are most readily 
apparent: public function theory, in which a private entity exercises 
power characteristic of the state in a manner that results in a 
constitutional deprivation; entanglement theory, in which the state 
and the private party charged with a deprivation enjoy a close 
relationship such that the state is a joint participant; and enforcement 
theory, in which the state enforces private agreements or explicitly 
sanctions private party conduct that results in a deprivation.  
 However helpful it may be for constitutional law professors to 
categorize state action cases, the categorical analysis proves 
unmanageable for the judiciary.27 Attempts to fit an octangular 
community association peg into the round holes of the categorical 
analysis have led most courts that have entertained the question to 
foreclose state action claims.28 Most rejections of community 
association state action claims result from a deficient application of 
precedent—the often stale comparison of associations borne out of our 
recent housing phenomenon to seemingly ancient actors held to 
account under three lines of cases decided half a century—or more—ago.  
 A brief overview of these three categories and examples of how they 
have been applied in the community association context highlights the 
problem with approaching state action doctrine in categories.  
                                                                                                                                                                       
 24. Cf. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US. 643, 656 (1961) (explaining that to provide a right without 
a remedy “is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment.”).  
 25. The phrase state action doctrine used in this Note generally refers to the excep-
tions to the state action requirement, not the general proposition that only state action can 
violate the Constitution. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.  
 26. See, e.g., Sabghir v. Eagle Trace Cmty. Ass’n, No. 96-6964-CIV-HURLEY, 1997 
WL 33635315, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 1997) (applying two tests for state action: public 
function and significant state involvement); Brock v. Watergate Mobile Home Park Ass’n, 
502 So. 2d 1380, 1381 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (applying two tests: public function and state 
involvement); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 510-27 (6th 
ed. 2000) (applying four tests: the Edmonson hybrid, public function, state commandment, 
and mutual contacts); GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1543-1608 (6th ed. 
2009) (focusing analysis on government neutrality and notable departures therefrom).  
 27. See discussion infra Part II.A–C; see, e.g., Lisa J. Chadderdon, Note, No Political 
Speech Allowed: Common Interest Developments, Homeowners Associations, and Re-
strictions on Free Speech, 21 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 233, 242 (2006) (“Each of the tests 
advanced by the above [categories] is different, and none has been consistently or regularly 
applied . . . . As such, there is no single, clear state action doctrine.”); Josiah N. Drew, 
Comment, The Sixth Circuit Dropped the Ball: An Analysis of Brentwood Acadamy v. Ten-
nessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n in Light of the Supreme Court’s Recent Trends in 
State Action Jurisprudence, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1313, 1340 (“Essentially, because the courts 
have these three flexible tests that they shape around the facts on a case-by-case basis, the 
state action area of the law is quite unpredictable and confusing.”).  
 28. See, e.g., Brock, 502 So. 2d at 1382 (explaining that a mobile homeowner’s associa-
tion is not like a company town nor is it sufficiently connected to the state).  
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A.  Public Function Theory  
Public function theory rests upon the proposition that a “state 
cannot free itself from the limitations of the Constitution in the 
operation of its governmental functions merely by delegating certain 
functions to otherwise private individuals.”29 The theory has its roots 
in a series of cases dealing with the Texas Democratic Party’s 
attempts to exclude blacks from voting in the party primary, first as 
a state prohibition, then as a party rule, and finally through a 
privately held “unofficial” primary in the Jay Bird Democratic 
Association which determined who would run in the official 
primary—usually unopposed.30
 Though the white primary cases concerned a state’s quite flagrant 
attempt to skirt the Constitution by direct, outright delegation to 
private actors, the public function theory also reared its head where 
private entities exercised power in a manner characteristic of the 
state—such as Chickasaw, the company town at issue in Marsh v. 
Alabama.31 In Marsh, a nonresident Jehovah’s Witness was arrested 
and charged with trespassing for distributing religious pamphlets on 
a sidewalk in the shopping district of a company-owned town.32 The 
Court reasoned the town did “not function differently from any other 
town,” and was therefore subject to the limitations of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.33
 After Marsh, the Court expanded its holding to implicate 
solicitation restrictions in private shopping malls34 but quickly 
reversed course.35 That private entities could be held to account by 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments as so-called “public forums” 
simply by opening their doors for business was an inconsistent 
extension of the doctrine.36 Rather than recognize the discredited 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 29. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 26, at 510. 
 30. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (holding exclusion from “unofficial” pre-
primary nominating convention unconstitutional); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) 
(holding state party convention rule unconstitutional); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) 
(holding party executive committee rule unconstitutional); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 
(1927) (holding statutory exclusion unconstitutional).  
 31. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
 32. See id. at 503.
 33. Id. at 508. 
 34. See Amalgamated Food Emps. Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 
U.S. 308 (1968) (holding injunction against peaceful picketing against store in private 
shopping center parking lot unconstitutional). 
 35. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (holding picketers had no First 
Amendment rights to picket in private shopping center); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 
551 (1972) (holding handbill distributors had no First Amendment rights to handbill in 
private shopping center simply because of general public invitation).  
 36. See Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Private Property, Public Property: Shopping Centers 
and Expressive Freedom in the States, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1229, 1262 (1999) (“Societal changes 
fail to warrant the infusion of such remarkable elements of constitutional relativism. . . . 
Economic freedom, like expressive liberty, cannot be selectively downgraded toward the 
achievement of ideological objectives currently in vogue.”). Cf. Julian N. Eule & Jonathan 
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public forum theory for the outlier it was, courts and commentators 
have given heavy weight to particularities of the Court’s retraction, 
transforming the way they analyze community associations under 
the public function theory.37 Some engage in a disingenuous inquiry 
into the services an association provides.38 One court found “the 
services provided by a homeowners association, unlike those provided 
in a company town, are merely a supplement to, rather than a 
replacement for, those provided by local government.”39 The New 
Jersey Supreme Court overturned a lower court decision finding state 
action but, instead of analyzing the issue, purported to apply a less 
constrained state action analysis under the state’s analog to the First 
Amendment—a provision it considers “broader than practically all 
others in the nation.”40 This less constrained analysis considered the 
state’s version of the defunct “public forum” test without accounting for 
whether the association performed a traditional government function.41
B.  Entanglement Theory  
 Just as a private actor who exercises traditional governmental 
authority is subject to the limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
a private actor engaged in a mutually beneficial relationship with the 
state may be subject to constitutional liability. A private actor’s 
conduct can be attributed to that of the state where the state “so far 
                                                                                                                                                                       
D. Varat, Transporting First Amendment Norms to the Private Sector: With Every Wish 
There Comes a Curse, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1537, 1539 (1998) (“[C]ategorical governmental 
imposition of First Amendment obligations on private parties presumptively conflicts with 
the First Amendment’s core protection against government-compelled orthodoxy—
including a government-compelled orthodoxy of the First Amendment itself.”); Jonathan D. 
Varat, When May Government Prefer One Source of Private Expression over Another?, 45 
UCLA L. REV. 1645, 1646 (1998) (“[B]lanket transfer of First Amendment obligations will 
impair severely the expressive rights of private entities” and “necessarily reflects a gov-
ernment decision to prefer one private speaker over another . . . .”).  
 37. See, e.g., Tansey-Warner, Inc. v. E. Coast Resorts, Inc., Civ. A. No. 720 (1978), 
1978 WL 22460, at *2 (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 1978) (must have all the attributes of and function 
sufficiently like a municipality).  
 38. Evelyn C. Lombardo, Comment, A Better Twin Rivers: A Revised Approach to 
State Action by Common-Interest Communities, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 1151, 1176 (2008) 
(“Some commentators . . . overemphasize the importance of community associations provid-
ing municipal services as a basis for equating the associations with state actors.”); see, e.g.,
Midlake on Big Boulder Lake, Condo. Ass’n v. Cappuccio, 673 A.2d 340, 342 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1996) (community association not like a municipality because it does not run schools or a 
library). This approach makes little sense because the services often described—utilities, 
trash pickup, schools, libraries, etc.—are “not traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the 
State.” Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974). At least some of these deci-
sions never even mention the quintessential governmental function and feature that com-
munity associations share with public governments—the regulation of conduct and proper-
ty within a geographically defined jurisdiction.  
 39. Brock v. Watergate Mobile Home Park Ass’n, 502 So. 2d 1380, 1382 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 1987).  
 40. Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners’ Ass’n, 929 A.2d 
1060, 1066-67 (N.J. 2007) (citation omitted).  
 41. Id. at 1067-74.  
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insinuate[s] itself into a position of interdependence with [a private 
actor] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the 
challenged activity . . . .”42
 In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, the Court found state 
action in the racially discriminatory conduct of a restaurant located 
within a public parking garage owned by the Wilmington Parking 
Authority.43 In essence, a close relationship between the state and a 
private actor can impute to the state. As the Court put more succinctly 
in a subsequent case, “[c]onduct that is formally ‘private’ may become 
so entwined with governmental policies or so impregnated with a 
governmental character” to implicate constitutional limits.44
 In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., the Court clarified that while 
“private misuse of a state statute does not describe conduct that can 
be attributed to the State, the procedural scheme created by the 
statute obviously is the product of state action.”45 It went on to 
impute the conduct of a private creditor to the state where it acted in 
joint participation with a state court to attach a debtor’s property in 
an ex parte proceeding.46 After Lugar, a case brought under an 
entanglement theory requires “joint participation” between private 
individuals and state institutions or officials.47
 Community associations are not generally held to account under 
this analysis. Courts most commonly analyze cases under Burton but 
apply language found in Moose Lodge or Metropolitan Edison: a 
highly detailed regulatory scheme is not enough.48 While these courts 
are correct on this point, they fail to recognize a whole spectrum of 
ways in which states and their political subdivisions place “power, 
property and prestige”49 behind community associations.50
C.  Enforcement Theory  
 With Shelley v. Kraemer51 came what had potential as a 
sweepingly broad third category under which private actors might be 
held to account by the Fourteenth Amendment. In Shelley, the Court 
overturned a state court’s enforcement of a racially restrictive 
covenant. The Court was unconvinced that the private character of 
the agreements were controlling in the analysis:  
                                                                                                                                                                       
 42. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961). 
 43. Id. at 722-26. 
 44. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966).  
 45. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982).  
 46. Id. at 941-42. 
 47. Id.
 48. See, e.g., Anelli v. Arrowhead Lakes Cmty. Ass’n, 689 A.2d 357, 361 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 1997) (citing Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175-77 (1972)) (holding de-
tailed regulatory scheme not state action).  
 49. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961). 
 50. See discussion infra Part III.A.  
 51. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
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The judicial action in each case bears the clear and unmistakable 
imprimatur of the State. We have noted that previous decisions of 
this Court have established the proposition that judicial action is 
not immunized from the operation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
simply because it is taken pursuant to the state’s common-law 
policy. Nor is the Amendment ineffective simply because the 
particular pattern of discrimination, which the State has enforced, 
was defined initially by the terms of a private agreement. State 
action, as that phrase is understood for the purposes of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, refers to exertions of state power in all 
forms. And when the effect of that action is to deny rights subject 
to the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is the obligation 
of this Court to enforce the constitutional commands.52
 In one way, community associations uniquely implicate this 
category of state action: they derive nearly all of their enforcement 
authority from the use of restrictive covenants.53 The formal power 
they hold over constituents usually rests on their ability to place 
liens and ultimately foreclose on the homes of those who fail to pay 
assessments and fines.?? As one Florida court put it, when a 
community association invokes the powers of a court to enforce its 
rules, “it invoke[s] the sovereign powers of the state to legitimize the 
restrictive covenant at issue.”55
 A little history might also be telling. Racial segregation was a 
marketing tool for early common interest community developers, 
and racial restrictive covenants were an intentional result of the 
planned community movement to which all community associations 
owe their existence.56
 Despite these similarities, Shelley has been dismissed by many as 
a “race case” limited to its facts.57 Court enforcement isn’t good 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 52. Id. at 20 (footnote omitted).  
 53. This authority is often supplemented by state statute. Daniel Goldmintz, Lien 
Priorities: The Defects of Limiting the “Super Priority” for Common Interest Communities,
33 CARDOZO L. REV. 267, 274 n.47 (2011) (stating that thirty states and the District of Co-
lumbia codify enforcement authority). States have recognized association authority in three 
ways: statutory law, common law covenants running with the land or equitable servitudes, 
and as contractual obligations undertaken at purchase. See id. at 274-75. 
 54. See generally Gemma Giantomasi, Note, A Balancing Act: The Foreclosure Power 
of Homeowners’ Associations, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2503 (2004). 
 55. Franklin v. White Egret Condo., Inc., 358 So. 2d 1084, 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), 
aff’d on other grounds, 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979).  
 56. MCKENZIE, supra note 6, at 36 (“As the twentieth century began, [developers] 
began heavy promotion of restrictive covenants through their professional associations. . . . 
Deed restrictions were the legal means by which developers were able to conduct privatized 
land planning and, in effect, lay out the suburbs of most major American cities. They intention-
ally created patterns of housing segregation by race and class that persist to the present.”).  
 57. See, e.g., Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1303 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Shelley has not 
been extended beyond race discrimination.”); Linn Valley Lakes Prop. Owners Ass’n v. 
Brockway, 824 P.2d 948, 951 (Kan. 1992) (extension of Shelley beyond race discrimination 
would require an “overly broad” interpretation of its holding); Midlake on Big Boulder Lake, 
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enough, some say, because private litigation, such as actions 
available to creditors under state enactments of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, cannot be said to implicate state action.58 Many 
rely on subsequent Supreme Court decisions, especially Flagg 
Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks: “the settlement of disputes between [private 
parties] is not traditionally an exclusive public function” and “the 
field of private commercial transactions would be a particularly 
inappropriate area” to apply it.59
 Some courts have found Shelley persuasive in state action claims 
against community associations. In one case, a federal district court 
cited Shelley and found disingenuous an argument that it was 
distinguishable as a race case.60 Another federal district court 
criticized the opinion for relying on “old-fashioned patriotism, rather 
than old-fashioned legal reasoning,” and because where the 
association “has not secured a state judgment against [a 
plaintiff] . . . , [that plaintiff] cannot establish state action under 
Shelley.”61 The Kansas Supreme Court distinguished Shelley as not 
just a race case depriving the Shelleys of the right to own property, 
instead finding it dispositive that the Shelleys “had no prior actual 
knowledge of the restrictive covenant.”62 In one interesting decision, a 
Florida appellate court applied Moore v. City of East Cleveland63 to 
strike down condominium restrictions that forbade children and any 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Condo. Ass’n v. Cappuccio, 673 A.2d 340, 342 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (holding that Shelley is 
not applicable to enforcement of restrictive covenants absent racial discrimination).  
 58. See, e.g., Loren, 309 F.3d at 1303.  
 59. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 161-63 (1978).  
 60. Gerber v. Longboat Harbour N. Condo., Inc., 724 F. Supp. 884, 887 (M.D. Fla. 
1989) (“It is an exercise in sophistry to posit that courts act as the state when enforcing 
racially restrictive covenants but not when giving effect to other provisions of the same 
covenant.”), vacated on other grounds by 757 F. Supp. 1339 (M.D. Fla. 1991). On rehearing, 
the court stated it “found and continues to find that judicial enforcement of private agree-
ments contained in a declaration of condominium constitutes state action and brings the 
heretofore private conduct within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . ,” although 
vacating in part its decision on other grounds. Gerber, 757 F. Supp. at 1341. 
 61. Goldberg v. 400 E. Ohio Condo. Ass’n, 12 F. Supp. 2d 820, 822-23 (N.D. Ill. 1998) 
(“It is difficult to understand, then, how the court in Gerber found state action before the 
state acted.”); see also Quail Creek Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Hunter, 538 So. 2d 1288, 1289 
(Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (finding possible enforcement of restrictive covenants not sufficient for 
state action). Goldberg, like Gerber, was a pre-enforcement challenge to an association rule, 
and the court did not “express [an] opinion on whether it would be proper to extend Shelley
to [community association] rules actually enforced by state courts.” Goldberg, 12 F. Supp 
2d at 823. This reasoning holds true for civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which 
includes an “under color of” state law requirement. Although the state action requirement 
of § 1983 is essentially synonymous with the state action requirement of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, § 1983 is a remedy for rights violations that have already occurred. A person 
does not have to expose herself to enforcement to challenge the constitutionality of a law if 
she can demonstrate an intention “to engage in a specific course of conduct ‘arguably af-
fected with a constitutional interest.’ ” ACLU v. Fla. Bar, 999 F.2d 1486, 1492 (11th Cir. 
1993) (quoting Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)).  
 62. Brockway, 824 P.2d at 951.  
 63. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).  
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living arrangement other than single-family residency.64 The court 
cited to Shelley as support for its finding of state action,65 but the 
Florida Supreme Court affirmed in result only.66 It instead 
established a public policy restriction against the arbitrary or 
capricious enforcement of age and residency restrictions on the basis 
that it could implicate constitutional values.67
 Courts may be apprehensive about upsetting the longstanding 
common law institution of covenants and servitudes. But the deed 
restrictions of today share little with their historical predecessors. 
“Early uses of covenants had to do with promises between individuals 
concerning use of their own land and had nothing to do with large-
scale planning by real estate developers,” while their current use only 
came about with the suburbanization of the twentieth century.68
These new deed restrictions do not memorialize a particular burden 
or benefit that runs with the land but rather impose an everlasting 
commitment to live by whatever rules the board of directors sees fit.69
 The express purpose of this innovative new scheme was the formation 
of private governments to supplement those of municipalities.70
D.  Voluntary Consent and the Common Law Perversion 
 The most popular criticism of attributing state action to the 
conduct of community associations is what has been seen as the 
consensual decision to buy property subject to conditions, covenants, 
and restrictions.71 This reliance on the voluntary nature of common 
law servitudes is both doctrinally and empirically misplaced. 
Doctrinally, consent has never been an element of any state action 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 64. Franklin v. White Egret Condo., Inc., 358 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), aff’d 
on other grounds, 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979).  
 65. Id. at 1089.  
 66. White Egret Condo., Inc., 379 So. 2d 346, 348 (Fla. 1979). 
 67. Id.
 68. MCKENZIE, supra note 6, at 33, 36-38. 
 69. See id.; cf. Woodside Vill. Condo. Ass’n v. Jahren, 806 So. 2d 452, 456 (Fla. 2002) 
(stating declarations are more than mere covenants running with the land); Shorewood W. 
Condo. Ass’n v. Sadri, 992 P.2d 1008 (Wash. 2000) (noting that amendments restricting 
leasing do not infringe on any legal right because unit owner had “notice before the units 
were bought that the declaration was changeable”); Hidden Harbour Estates v. Basso, 393 
So. 2d 637, 640 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (explaining board rules are subject to a deferential 
“reasonableness” standard). 
 70. Id. at 29-31; see discussion infra Part III.A.  
 71. See, e.g., Bryan v. MBC Partners, L.P., 541 S.E.2d 124, 127 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) 
(freedom of contract allows individuals to waive constitutional and legal rights); Bd. of 
Managers of Old Colony Vill. Condo. v. Preu, 956 N.E.2d 258, 261-62 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011) 
(citing Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991)) (finding state action but noting 
importance that association did not claim unit owner voluntarily and knowingly waived 
rights in buying condo unit); Reichman, supra note 13, at 276 (“Neither Shelley nor Marsh
dealt with a situation, like the present one, in which a person was attempting to avoid his 
voluntarily assumed obligations because they violated his constitutionally protected 
rights.”); Judicial Review of Condominium Rulemaking, 94 HARV. L. REV. 647, 657 (1981) 
(“[C]onsent arguably vitiates the basis for constitutional review.”).  
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analysis. Empirically, residential property not subject to community 
association governance is increasingly scarce, raising a question of 
whether its purchase is truly a voluntary acquiescence to community 
association governance.  
 Those who seek to purchase a home not encumbered by covenants 
requiring membership in a community association find it an 
increasingly difficult task, such that one might question exactly how 
voluntary such agreements really are.72 Indeed, “the notion of consent 
to the [community association] legal regime at the time [of purchase] 
is simply incompatible with the exigencies of the housing market.”73
 No matter how pervasive community associations are today, the 
voluntary nature of subjecting oneself to constitutional violations is 
not a subject of inquiry in constitutional analysis; if it were, one 
might reason the decision to locate in a given city should be 
considered a voluntary acquiescence to its municipal government’s 
unconstitutional action—a meritless proposition. Yet voluntariness is 
a chief reason given by courts and commentators against charging 
association conduct to the state.74
 The decision to purchase property in a particular community 
association is no more or less voluntary than the decision to purchase 
property in a particular municipality or even in a particular state.75 A 
state action analysis foreclosed by voluntary consent is inconsistent 
with the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, under which a state 
actor cannot require an individual to choose between some benefit and 
a constitutional right, “even if he has no entitlement to that benefit.”76
 The voluntary excuse also offends the longstanding principle that 
government derives its power “from the consent of the governed.”77
This proposition represents not just a general consent through 
republican notions of representation, petition, and redress, but that a 
citizen has the prerogative to choose her place of residence without 
concern for how that locality recognizes her rights.78 While she is 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 72. Recent Case, New Jersey Supreme Court Holds that Restrictions in Common Inter-
est Community Do Not Violate the State’s Constitution, 121 HARV. L. REV. 644, 650 (2007) 
[hereinafter Recent Case, Twin Rivers] (“The prospect of living in a community that is not 
governed by a homeowners’ association is hence becoming more elusive for many Ameri-
cans.”); see also supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.  
 73. Siegel, supra note 11, at 469.  
 74. See supra note 68.  
 75. Edward R. Hannaman, Homeowner Association Problems and Solutions, 5 RUTGERS 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 699, 701 n.4 (2008) (“The only way to avoid the board’s jurisdiction is to sell 
one’s home and move—exactly as if one desires to avoid State or local government jurisdiction.”).  
 76. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 59 
(2006) (citations omitted). 
 77. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 78. Although no provision explicitly protects freedom of movement, the Court has 
attributed the right to various clauses or found it implicit in the structure of the Constitu-
tion. See U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 
503-04 (1999); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969) (“This Court long ago recog-
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entitled to take such considerations into account and vote with her 
feet, her decision does not give her state and local governments 
license to ignore constitutional constraints. Citizens often take 
personal and economic freedom into account when considering 
whether to move to another state,79 but the Court did not ask why 
Dick Heller would remain in the District of Columbia with full 
knowledge of its uniquely prohibitive firearms laws.80 It did not 
question whether John Lawrence moved to Texas on his own 
initiative, or even whether he considered moving in light of its laws 
against homosexual sex.81 Nor did it ask the parents of John and 
Mary Beth Tinker whether they had considered home schooling 
their children.82 The Court did not ask these questions because they 
do not matter.  
 Likewise, Marsh could have evangelized somewhere other than 
Chickasaw, Burton could have dined down the street, and the 
Shelleys could have purchased a home in a more welcome 
neighborhood. To ask whether one’s decision to purchase a residence 
burdened by conditions, covenants, and restrictions is voluntary 
would not only be inconsistent with constitutional principles, but the 
history of state action doctrine itself.  
III. A MORE FAITHFUL APPROACH TO THE DOCTRINE
 Courts have continued to apply a splintered, categorical analysis 
in state action cases against community associations despite the 
Court’s consistent warnings that “to fashion and apply a precise 
formula . . . is an ‘impossible task.’ ”83 A categorical analysis doesn’t 
lend itself well to “sifting facts and weighing circumstances” to 
determine the “true significance” of “the nonobvious involvement of 
the State in private conduct.”84 In applying state action doctrine 
below, courts have routinely compared and contrasted the actors of 
historic cases in an attempt to fit community associations into the 
neat categories of decades’ old situations lacking contemporary analogs.  
                                                                                                                                                                       
nized that the nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal 
liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth 
of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or 
restrict this movement.”).  
 79. WILLIAM P. RUGER & JASON SORENS, GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY MERCATUS 
CENTER, FREEDOM IN THE 50 STATES: AN INDEX OF PERSONAL AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM 1 
(2011), available at http://www.mercatus.org/freedom-50-states-2011. 
 80. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (holding a city ordinance 
banning handgun possession in the home violated Second Amendment). 
 81. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
 82. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 83. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (quoting Kotch v. 
Bd. of River Port Pilot Comm’rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947)).  
 84. Id. See also supra Part II for a discussion of courts’ attempts to confine their anal-
ysis to these three “boxes.” 
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 Perhaps recognizing the inconsistencies generated by lower courts’ 
applications of the doctrine, the Court explained exactly how to 
determine whether or not a private actor’s conduct can be held to 
account by the Constitution despite not fitting neatly into a 
particular category.85 The analysis is a two-part inquiry: “first[,] 
whether the claimed constitutional deprivation resulted from the 
exercise of a right or privilege having its source in state authority; 
and second, whether the private party charged with the deprivation 
could be described in all fairness as a state actor.”86 The first question 
simply asks whether the action at issue was taken in conformity with 
state law. The second question is answered by a fact-based inquiry into 
the extent to which an actor relies on the government, performs public 
functions, or should otherwise be held to account as a state actor.87
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., recognized that some cases 
don’t necessarily strongly implicate just one theory of state action but 
are sufficiently characterized for state action because they touch on 
all three. Although the decision dealt with a jury selection system not 
new or novel, it recognizes the private institutions of generations 
past were. The world has changed much since the decisions of Marsh,
Shelley, and Burton, which aren’t entirely comparable with their 
contemporary analogs.88 Certainly they shouldn’t form the bases for 
three distinct tests. Put another way, company towns, segregated 
restaurants leasing public property, and racially restrictive covenants 
have little practical significance today, and the contemporary 
replacements for these actors are not replicas; they represent 
innovations in law and society that implicate state action in a way that 
cannot be ascertained through side-by-side comparisons to institutions 
abandoned long before these new threats came.  
                                                                                                                                                                       
 85. The Court recognized that “generalizations do not decide concrete cases” in finding 
that an entanglement analysis was “buttressed” by the additional consideration of the pub-
lic function the private actor served in Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299-301 (1966). See 
also Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 849 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(“[P]erformance of a public function is by itself sufficient to justify treating a private entity 
as a state actor only where the function has been traditionally the exclusive prerogative of 
the State. But the fact that a private entity is performing a vital public function, when 
coupled with other factors demonstrating a close connection with the State, may justify a 
finding of state action.” (citations and quotations omitted)).  
 86. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991) (citations omitted). 
 87. Id. at 621-22. 
 88. To a degree, this depends on the level of generality applied. For example, the 
Marsh Court made much of the contemporary significance of the company town: “Many 
people in the United States live in company-owned towns. . . . There is no more reason for 
depriving these people of the liberties guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments than there is for curtailing these freedoms with respect to any other citizen.” Marsh 
v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1946). Since Marsh, “company towns virtually have dis-
appeared and [community associations] have grown to . . . occupy a similar, if not more 
dominant, position than that occupied by company towns some fifty years ago.” Siegel, 
supra note 11, at 490. Courts, even the Supreme Court, have limited the doctrine’s reach by 
comparing cases to a high degree of specificity. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.  
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Edmonson first asks whether the conduct at issue was taken in 
conformity with state law. If an association has otherwise violated 
state law in taking the challenged action, the analysis ends here. For 
example, where state law requires approval by a majority of all unit 
owner voting interests to enact a new use restriction, an association 
that attempts to enact a rule prohibiting political yard signs89 merely 
by a vote of the board of directors fails to meet the first requirement 
of the Edmonson test. Likewise, where a state law prohibits an 
association from abridging the right of owners to peaceably 
assemble,90 an association that enacts a blanket ban on the use of 
common areas for political purposes could not do so in conformity 
with state law. 
Next, a court should consider “[1] the extent to which the actor 
relies on governmental assistance and benefits, [2] whether the actor 
is performing a traditional governmental function, and [3] whether 
the injury caused is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of 
governmental authority.”91 These factors are a rough recasting of the 
questions found in each of the three categories often relied upon by 
courts. Instead of attempting to fit community associations into the 
neat confines of a single category, however, courts should consider how 
and the extent to which community associations implicate all three.92
A.  Community Associations Enjoy Unique Governmental  
Benefits and Assistance 
 An actor’s reliance on governmental assistance or benefits to 
execute the challenged action is a question of whether the state has 
“ ‘create[d] the legal framework governing the [challenged] conduct.’ ”93
Nearly all states have enacted legislation to provide for homeowners’ 
associations, and all states have enacted legislation to provide for the 
creation and governance of condominiums.94 Although legislative 
schemes vary from state to state, statutes usually provide associations 
express powers and duties, including the authority to enact rules and 
regulations governing many aspects of residential life.95
 Local governments often work with developers or even zone new 
residential developments to require community association 
                                                                                                                                                                       
89. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1353.6 (West 2004); A.B. 805, 2011-2012, Reg. Sess. 
(Cal. 2012). 
 90. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 718.123 (2012).  
 91. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 621-22 (citations omitted). 
 92. In Edmonson, the Court explains exactly what considerations under each factor 
are significant to the analysis by exporting the general principles of its past cases. See id.  
 93. Id. at 624. 
 94. HOA-USA, GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS, at 3, ????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? (last 
visited Nov. 13, 2012); Gary A. Poliakoff, The Phantom of the Condominium, 72 FLA. B.J.
44, 45 (1998) (stating that condominiums are statutorily regulated in all fifty states). 
95.  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1363 (West 2012); FLA. STAT. § 718.111 (2012).  
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governance.96 A local government often “gets benefits as a result of 
increased population and increased tax base and yet does not have to 
assume all of the responsibility and costs for providing public services 
to the new residents.”97 As planned development communities began to 
sprout, private residential developers organized into a powerful 
political influence that directly transformed the emerging system of 
public land planning and land-use regulation.98 The developers 
recognized “the importance of developing a symbiotic relationship 
with government” in their efforts to expand the highly profitable 
market for planned development communities.99
 This symbiotic relationship provides an “increase in the local tax 
base which occurs without a proportionate increase in costs to local 
government,” returning “to the local government many more tax 
dollars per acre than would be possible through any other form of 
residential development.”100 With benefits like these, it comes as no 
surprise that many local governments enact zoning regulations that 
require land be developed according to the planned development 
model, complete with community association governance.101
 State legislatures also paved the way for community association 
governance with statutes recognizing and enabling various types of 
cooperative living.102 In addition to burdening the land, some statutes 
bind the members of the association.103 Courts have elevated 
community associations to governmental status, giving broad 
deference to associations in their efforts to restrict property owners’ 
freedom.104 In some states, associations enjoy special statutory 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 96. Siegel, supra note 12, at 859-62.  
 97. C. JAMES DOWDEN, URBAN LAND INST. & CMTY. ASS’NS INST., COMMUNITY ASSOCI-
ATIONS: A GUIDE FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS 41-42 (1980). 
 98. MCKENZIE, supra note 6, at 38. Deed restrictions and other features devised by 
community developers were later adopted by public planners and “became part of typical 
zoning laws.” Id.  
 99. Id.
 100. DOWDEN, supra note 97, at 51-52.  
 101. See Recent Case, Twin Rivers, supra note 72, at 650 (“For local governments, 
[common interest communities] are similarly appealing, so cities have encouraged the devel-
opment of such communities through land use and zoning restrictions.”) (footnotes omitted).  
 102. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 718.111, 720.303 (2012); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 605/18.4 (2010).  
 103. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 720.305 (2012) (“Each member and the member’s tenants, 
guests, and invitees . . . are governed by, and must comply with, this chapter, the governing 
documents of the community, and the rules of the association. Actions at law or in equity, or 
both, to redress alleged failure or refusal to comply . . . may be brought by the association . . . .”).  
 104. See, e.g., Woodside Vill. Condo. Ass’n v. Jahren, 806 So. 2d 452, 457 (Fla. 2002) 
(“Courts have also consistently recognized that restrictions contained within a declaration 
of condominium should be clothed with a very strong presumption of validity when chal-
lenged.”); Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. 4th DCA 
1975) (stating “[o]n the contrary, we believe the test is reasonableness,” in response to the 
trial judge’s holding that community association rules must be related to the protection of 
life, property, or the general welfare of residents); Bd. of Dirs. v. Hinojosa, 679 N.E.2d 407, 
410 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (explaining that an association “generally has broad powers and its 
rules govern the requirements of day-to-day living . . . .”). California codified the reasona-
bleness standard and places the burden on the individual property owner to prove a re-
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privileges to place liens on individuals’ property for failure to pay 
assessments or fines resulting from violations of rules.105 Even where 
an association lacks lien authority, it may exercise common law or 
statutory rights to sue for violations of the covenants, conditions, 
and restrictions.106
 The federal government has also encouraged planned development 
communities since the New Deal.107 Early on, Federal Housing 
Authority underwriting policies “indirectly set a national zoning 
policy” that favored community developers, and its land planning 
efforts advised them how to plan neighborhoods.108 The FHA also 
suggested and sometimes required the use of racially restrictive 
covenants.109 As an unabashed advocate for the proliferation of 
planned development communities, the FHA began insuring 
community associations and even wrote a 422-page handbook to 
promote the benefits of community association living and guide “land 
developers, planners, home builders, appraisers, mortgage lenders, 
realtors, attorneys, association officers and public officials” in the 
development of community association-governed neighborhoods.110
 The benefits community associations derive from government are 
widespread. Community associations are largely the result of 
government efforts to create more low-cost housing, increase 
economic development, and enlarge tax bases without a proportional 
increase in the cost of government.111 For each action a community 
association takes, it does so with the authority of the state, usually 
through an enabling statute. Courts should weigh this factor heavily 
in applying Edmonson to community associations.  
                                                                                                                                                                       
striction is unreasonable. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1354 (West 2005). The reasonableness test 
resembles the highly deferential business judgment rule often applied in challenges to the 
decisions of the board of directors of for-profit corporations. See Hollywood Towers Condo. 
Ass’n v. Hampton, 40 So. 3d 784, 787 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (A number of “courts have ap-
plied an adaptation of the business judgement rule to decisions made by condominium 
associations.”). Interestingly, few of the justifications for the business judgment rule apply 
to community associations: the courts’ inability to evaluate business decisions (such as 
“what business should a corporation pursue, what risks are acceptable, what returns are 
desired”), the market sufficiently polices bad management decisions, portfolio diversifica-
tion, and liquidity—the ease with which a shareholder may vote with her feet. Cf. Craig W. 
Palm & Mark A. Kearney, A Primer on the Basics of Directors’ Duties in Delaware: The 
Rules of the Game (Part I), 40 VILL. L. REV. 1297, 1302, n.13 (1995) (explaining the reason-
ing behind the business judgment rule in the corporations for profit context).  
 105. See, e.g., N.C. GEN STAT. § 47F-3-107.1 (2012).  
 106. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 720.305 (2012).  
 107. See DONALD R. STABILE, COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: THE EMERGENCE AND AC-
CEPTANCE OF A QUIET INNOVATION IN HOUSING 78-84 (2000). 
 108. Id. at 78.  
 109. Id. at 80.  
 110. Id. at 92; FED. HOUS. ADMIN. LAND PLANNING BULL. NO. 6 (1963, 1964, 1967,
1970, 1973).
 111. DOWDEN, supra note 97, at 51-52.  
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B.  Community Associations Exercise Traditional  
Governmental Functions 
 The second factor asks “whether the action in question involves 
the performance of a traditional function of the government.”112
Unlike public function theory under the categorical analysis, which 
was limited to the functional equivalent of a municipality,113 the 
Edmonson analysis also considers the source of the power exercised: 
“that the government delegates some portion of this power to 
private [parties] does not change the governmental character of the 
power exercised.”114
 A community association “has powers and responsibilities that are 
similar to those of local governments,”115 whose members “comprise a 
little democratic sub society.”116 The model of governance is the same 
council-manager form of governance used by nearly half of all U.S. 
municipalities today. Like city government, community associations 
hold elections for a small group of representatives who oversee the 
budget, make policy decisions, and pass regulations. Many require 
regulations be enacted by referendum, requiring approval by a 
majority of voting interests.  
 The boards of directors are responsible for hiring administrators 
to conduct day-to-day business of the association, and many employ 
security guards to keep the peace and enforce regulations. 
Community associations collect assessments functionally equivalent 
to real estate taxes, and many also control infrastructure, such as 
roads, sewers, and bulk telecommunications delivery.117
 The modern planned development community was conceived as a 
“privatized version of council-manager municipal government.”118
Community associations, although sometimes ostensibly 
characterized as voluntary in membership, “exist both alongside and 
subordinate to public governments [and] exhibit . . . fundamental 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 112. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 624 (1991). 
 113. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 519 (1976); see also discussion supra Part II.A.  
 114. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 626. 
 115. DIV. FLA. CONDOS., TIMESHARES, AND MOBILE HOMES, DEP’T OF BUS. & PROF’L
REGULATION, CONDOMINIUM LIVING IN FLORIDA 2 (2010); see also GARY A. POLIAKOFF, The 
Role of the Association in Condominium Operations, in FLORIDA CONDOMINIUM LAW AND 
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political characteristics.”119 Until recently, proponents of common 
interest communities “clearly and explicitly understood they were 
creating residential private governments.”120 Now, special interests 
and courts resist labeling community associations as private 
governments, reflecting “a concern that constitutional limitations on 
municipal government activity might become applicable to 
[community] associations.”121
 The concern is warranted, but avoiding a label does not change 
the character of authority entrusted to community associations. 
These powers are the result of direct and indirect delegations of 
authority from local governments, many of which have crafted 
policies favoring the development of and delegated authority to 
association-governed common interest communities through zoning 
policies or exceptions for developers.122
C.  Government Authority Uniquely Aggravates the Injury 
 The final factor asks “whether the injury caused is aggravated in a 
unique way by the incidents of governmental authority.”123 In 
Edmonson, the Court simply considered this factor satisfied by noting 
“the injury caused by the discrimination is made more severe because 
the government permits it to occur within the courthouse itself.”124
 The answer to this question is more apparent where the action of 
a community association is challenged after the association attempts 
to enforce it through the judiciary. Edmonson could stand for the 
proposition that the discrimination was particularly egregious 
because the discriminatory act occurred in the courtroom during the 
process of litigation. But because the Court cites to Shelley for this 
proposition, it seems more likely the Court intended for a broader 
interpretation: courts, as the final arbiters of constitutional 
questions, should not be an instrumentality used to abridge 
constitutional rights because “[f]ew places are a more real expression 
of the constitutional authority of the government than a courtroom, 
where the law itself unfolds.”125 That courts ultimately empower 
community associations should be considered even where a given 
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case is initiated by the individual homeowner against the association 
because the mere threat of a lien can be coercion enough. 
 Government has at times encouraged, incentivized, and even 
required community association governance in a manner that could 
satisfy this inquiry. The FHA’s advocacy for the inclusion of racially 
restrictive covenants seems to aggravate the type of discrimination 
that occurred in Shelley.126 A local government recognizing the limits 
of state police power may find—through policies that encourage or 
require the development of association-governed common interest 
communities—they can achieve results ascertainable only by 
unconstrained, “private” power.  
 Whatever the motive, the rich history of federal, state, and local 
government involvement in the creation of conditions through which 
a fifth of all U.S. citizens are subjected to extraconstitutional power 
should be a persuasive factor in the analysis.  
IV. CONCLUSION
 Under the Supreme Court’s most recent formulation of state 
action doctrine, the case for finding state action in the conduct of 
community associations is persuasive. This conduct may be fairly 
attributed to the state when considering the extent to which 
community associations exercise power in a manner that implicates 
the three factors of the Edmonson test.  
 However, courts have not relied on this test in cases involving 
community associations. Some courts have found that community 
associations simply don’t fit into a given category, while others 
theorize that the purchase of land encumbered with covenants and 
governed by an association is willing and voluntary. But voluntary 
acquiescence does not factor into the doctrinal equation, and the 
growing proportion of properties encumbered with covenants that 
provide for community association governance has made it 
increasingly difficult for a prospective home buyer to avoid, especially 
in the suburbs of metropolitan areas.  
 Given the extent to which community associations limit the 
exercise of individual rights and the manner in which they supplant 
traditional government, courts should take more seriously these 
claims of state action by analyzing community associations under the 
Edmonson test. Rather than try to compare community associations 
to company towns, restaurants in public parking garages, or an 
explicit racially restrictive covenant, courts should follow the 
Edmonson formulation and recognize community associations for 
what they are: pervasive private governments that may seriously 
undermine fundamental liberties if not properly held to account.  
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